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dense for students, laypersons, or non-philosophers, especially those on personal identity (chs. 6 & 7). Nonetheless, I would highly recommend it for
classroom use and to pass along to thinking friends. It is an important contribution to a most significant topic.

God and the Burden of Proof, by Keith M. Parsons. Buffalo, New York:
Prometheus Books, 1989. Forward by Kai Nielsen. Pp. 156. $38.95.
GEORGE S. PAPPAS, Ohio State University.
This book is a limited and largely non-technical examination, from a perspective of what the author calls 'secular humanism,' of recent "analytical" defenses of theism. It is limited in that attention is restricted to Plantinga's
discussion of belief in God as properly basic, Swinburne's account of the
cosmological argument (in Swinburne's The Existence of God), and
Plantinga's presentation of the free will defense against the argument from
evil. Parsons discusses each of these topics in some depth, and reaches the
overall conclusion that " ... when it comes to philosophical argumentation
about the truth of theism, game, set, and match go to the atheists" (147).
Readers might find it odd that such a sweeping conclusion is reached after a
limited exploration of the field. Partly this conclusion is supported by a
re-definition of the term 'atheism.' Parsons follows Flew in taking an atheist
to be someone who is not a theist (31). Thus, for him an atheist need not
believe that there is no God; simple agnosticism will suffice to count one as
an atheist. But, according to Parsons, a person who lacks a belief is under no
responsibility to provide grounds for that lack; so, an atheist is under no
intellectual or epistemic obligation to provide grounds for her lack of belief.
It follows, Parsons holds, that theists have a burden of proof; they are under
some sort of obligation to provide justifying grounds for theism. If theists
have no good grounds for the claim that God exists, then atheism wins the
match.
Parsons holds that Plantinga's attempt to show that belief that God exists
may be taken as properly basic goes too far. The reason is that this same
attempt will license some atheist in taking the belief that there is no God to
be properly basic, and thus atheism will be rational at least for this one atheist.
The reason is this: Plantinga holds that one must use an inductive procedure
to establish criteria for proper basicality. One begins with cases which are
obviously properly basic in certain conditions, frames hypotheses stating
prospective necessary and sufficient conditions for proper basicality, and then
tests these conditions against the paradigm cases. Parsons takes this to mean
that Plantinga picks beliefs that are obviously properly basic to him, and then
frames relevant hypotheses. Another person not inclined to theism may find
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other beliefs, inconsistent with theism, to be obviously properly basic and
then test relevant hypotheses against these beliefs. Parsons holds that these
individuals will devise different criteria for proper basicality, and so concludes that" ... a belief might be rationally accepted as basic by one person
but equally rationally rejected by another. Again, it all depends on which set
of beliefs is initially taken as obviously properly basic" (51).
It is not clear that Plantinga must be read in this fashion. A more plausible
account would have him first finding examples of what just about anyone
would take as obviously properly basic, figuring out what it is about such
examples that qualifies them as properly basic, and then arguing that theistic
beliefs meet these conditions. So read, it is clear that Parsons' main criticism
of Plantinga does not apply.
Parsons' discussion of Swinburne is also very limited, since he deals only
with the latter's treatment of the cosmological argument. Overall, Swinburne's account is presented fully and accurately. Parsons rejects Swinburne's
conclusion (that the probability that the universe exists given that God exists
is greater than the probability that the universe exists given no God) on two
main grounds, both of them involving disanalogies between scientific hypotheses and the God hypothesis. The first is that the God hypothesis is
recommended solely by its alleged simplicity, while scientific hypotheses are
not (82-83). Indeed, when simplicity is the only support in favor of a scientific
theory, then the entities it postulates are regarded as fictions until empirical
confirmation is forthcoming (81-82, 86). A second disanalogy is that scientific theories often systematize known empirical laws, in the way that Newtonian physics explains Kepler's laws of motion by implying them, while
Swinburne" ... freely admits that no facts about the world can be deduced
from the theistic hypothesis" (86). So the sole support for the theistic hypothesis is its alleged simplicity, and Parsons doubts there is any scientific
hypothesis that" ... to a similar degree stakes its confirmation entirely upon
the criterion of simplicity" (87).
It is unclear just how damaging these criticisms are to Swinburne's project.
After all, for Swinburne the cosmological argument is just one of the C-inductive arguments he considers, and there are a number of others. To be in a
position to conclude that Swinburne has not established the rationality of
theistic belief given just the criticisms offered by Parsons one would have to
hold that the additional arguments discussed by Swinburne taken together do
not suffice to constitute a good P-inductive argument for theism. But nothing
in Parsons' discussion of the cosmological argument supports this contention.
Parsons also discusses the logical version of the argument from evil, along
with Plantinga's free will defense. He concludes this balanced and fair discussion by conceding that Plantinga has established the consistency of theism
and the existence of evil (p. 125). Strangely, instead of going on to discuss
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the inductive version of the argument from evil, Parsons confines his attention
to the question of whether God would be justified in permitting some evil to
exist, in some completely undefined sense of 'justified.' In this regard he
considers Swinburne's attempt to show that God would be justified in allowing some natural evil to occur, and concludes that Swinburne's arguments on
this front fail to establish that God's preventing some natural evils would
result in an even worse state of affairs, namely an abridgement or reduction
in human free will and responsibility (p. 139-40). Hence, some natural evil
is "superfluous," i.e., such that God is not justified in permitting it. Parsons
concludes that" ... atheists have a strong argument to offer against the truth
of theism" (p. 141). Whether Parsons would have grounds for such a conclusion were the inductive argument from evil duly considered, along with
perhaps Plantinga's detailed discussion of that argument is another matter.
Parsons' book is clearly written, easy to read and easy to follow. It could
prove useful to those who want a good non-technical introduction to the
topics he discusses. My biggest reservation, as I have indicated above, is that
his general conclusions are not well enough supported given the very limited
terrain which he covers.

